St. John's Law Review
Volume 12, April 1938, Number 2

Article 12

Charitable Subscriptions--Assignability--Consideration--Sufficiency
of Complaint (I & I Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 276 N.Y. 427
(1938))
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

1938]

RECENT DECISIONS

and carrier should be treated as a question of fact to be determined
by the evidence. 10
In the instant case the question of fact was settled in favor of the
plaintiff. He had made a prior oral agreement with the defendant,
but no choice of rates was offered to him. To find for the defendant
would be to nullify the rule requiring the carrier to afford the shipper
a choice of rates in order to limit his common law liability. To find
for the plaintiff is to reaffirm the well established rule that an agent
has no authority to modify a contract made by his principal."
T.G.

CHARITABLE

-SUFFICIEN

SUBSCRIPTIONs-AsSIGNABILITY-CONSIDERATION

CY OF COMPLAINT.-The following subscription was

signed and delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff's assignor: "To
aid and assist the Beth Israel Hospital Association in its humanitarian work, and in consideration of others contributing to the same
purposes the undersigned does hereby promise to pay to the order of
the Beth Israel Hospital Building * * * the sum of $5000 * * *. The

undersigned further requests each and every other contributor to make
his contribution in reliance upon the contribution of the undersigned
herewith made." The plaintiff alleges that the hospital "upon said
subscription * * * proceeded with its humanitarian work, obtained
other like subscriptions, expended large sums of money and incurred
large liabilities. * * *"

Defendant contends (1)

that the complaint

is insufficient as the subscription does not allege specific acts of consideration and being merely a general donation should not be enforced
by the courts of this state; 1 (2) that such agreements are not assignable. On appeal, held, judgment for plaintiff affirmed. There is
an implied request that the hospital continue with its humanitarian
work. Such request constitutes an offer of a unilateral contract,
which, when accepted by the charity by incurring liability in reliance
" In Waldron v. Fargo, 170 N. Y. 130, 62 N. E. 1077 (1902), the plaintiff
sued to recover the value of horses destroyed in transportation. The defendant
carrier set up a valuation agreement, claiming to have made it with the plaintiff's shipping agent. Notwithstanding that the plaintiff gave evidence of a
prior oral agreement by which the defendant assumed his common law liability,
the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant. The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that it was for the jury to find whether or not the
prior agreement claimed by the plaintiff had been made.
'See note 7, supra.
'Trustees of Hamilton College v. Stewart, 1 N. Y. 581 (1848) (a donation
"the interest of which shall be applied to the payment of the officers" of
Hamilton College was held unenforcible on the ground of lack of consideration) ; Hammond v. Shepard, 29 How. Pr. 188 (N. Y. 1865) (an agreement to
apply the money for college purposes was not considered sufficient consideration
for a promise to pay the trustees of the college a specified sum).
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thereon, became a binding contract. A contract of this nature is
assignable. I & I Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg, 276 N. Y. 427, 12
N. E. (2d) 532 (1938).
While the courts of England have, in the absence of substantial
consideration, refused to enforce charitable subscriptions,2 the weight
of authority in this country, under various theories, recognizes and
enforces such agreements. 3 The courts in New York rely upon the
theory that the subscription is an offer and becomes binding when accepted by the charity through the performance of an act in reliance
upon it. 4 The courts, however, will not enforce a gratuitous promise
although the object intended to be promoted may be a worthy one, 5
for an agreement without consideration is a nudum pactum; "but any
degree of reciprocity will prevent the pact from being nude." 6 Acts
of consideration need not be specified, but may be implied even from
facts outside the subscription agreement, 7 and the subscription becomes binding when accepted by the consummation of the requested
act.8 The theory which holds that the request of one subscriber that
others make contributions on the strength of his subscription is sufficient consideration to support his promise, has never been accepted
by the courts of this state, 9 although other states have seen fit to sus2In re Hudson, 54 L.,J. Ch. 811. Followed in the United States in Trustees
of Hamilton College v. Stewart, 1 N. Y. 581 (1848); Phillips Limerick Acad-

emy v. Davies, 11 Mass. 113 (1814).
'The courts of this country when dealing with charitable subscriptions
have found consideration in an act performed by the charity at the request,
express or implied, of the subscriber (n.4 infra); or that the various subscriptions running to the charity are consideration for each other (n.10 infra) ;
even the fact that the subscription will be applied to the object for which it
was made has been held consideration (Note 48 L. R. A. [N. s.] 784). In
some states the courts have adopted the doctrine of promissory estoppel (n.15
infra) and others have gone so far as to hold that consideration in charitable
subscription cases is not necessary (n.13 infra). Billig, The Problem of Consideration in Charitable Subscriptions (1926) 12 CORN. L. Q. 467.
'Keuka College v. Ray, 167 N. Y. 96, 60 N. E. 325 (1901) ; Roberts v.
Cobb, 103 N. Y. 600, 9 N. E. 500 (1886); Richmondville Union Seminary v.
McDonald, 34 N. Y. 379 (1866); Barnes v. Perine, 12 N. Y. 18 (1854);
Central Presbyterian Church v. Thomson, 8 App. Div. 565, 40 N. Y. Supp. 912
(4th Dept. 1896); lt re Reed's Estate, 133 Misc. 903, 233 N. Y. Supp. 450
(1929).
'Pershall v. Elliot, 249 N. Y. 183, 163 N. E. 554 (1928); Presbyterian
Church of Albany v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517, 20 N. E. 352 (1889) ; Trustees of'
Hamilton College v. Stewart, 1 N. Y. 581 (1848).
' 2 BL. Comm. 445.

'Matter of Taylor, 251 N. Y. 257, 167 N. E. 434 (1929); Doughert v.
Salt, 227 N. Y. 200, 125 N. E. 94 (1919); Keuka College v. Ray, 167 N. Y.
96, 60 N. E. 325 (1901) ; Presbyterian Church of Albany v. Cooper, 112 N. Y.
517, 20 N. E. 325 (1889).
' See cases in n.4 supra. Also see Note 48 L. R. A. 787, REs. L. CoNTRACTS § 90, 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 116. For the view
taken by the federal courts see Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Bryn
Mawr Trust Co., 87 F. (2d) 607 (1936).
Contra: Hamilton College v. Stewart, 2 Denio 403 (N. Y. 1845). This
view was overruled when that case came before the Court of Appeals (1 N. Y.
581 [1848]) and has since been condemned as unsound in principle. See opin-

1938]

RECENT DECISIONS

tain it.1° However, where certain other subscriptions are secured
at the express request of a subscriber there is sufficient consideration."
Judge Lehman dissenting in the instant case contends that, "Mere
continuance of the charitable work, as it might have done even if no
promise had been made, does not constitute consideration for the
promise, or give rise to a promissory estoppel." However, it would
seem that the test for consideration is not whether the promisee would
or would not have performed the requested act from other motives;
but that the law is satisfied if the act requested of him be performed
in reliance upon the request, and the promisee was not already legally
bound to do it. Whether the promisee had already intended to do the
act or would have done it even though the promisor had not made
the offer has no bearing on its sufficiency as consideration. 12
The courts, endeavoring to effect that public policy which recognizes the moral obligation of a charitable subscription and the necessity for its enforcement as the life blood of the eleemosynary institutions,1 3 yet, unwilling to abandon that rule which declares gratuitous promises to be unenforcible,. 4 have evolved the doctrine of promissory estoppel 15 and adapted it to these cases. It need not be inion of Andrews, J., in Presbyterian Church of Albany v .Cooper, 12 N. Y. 517,
20 N. E. 325 (1889) at p. 522. See also Roberts v. Cobb, 103 N. Y. 600,
9 N. E. 500 (1886) ; Barnes v. Perine, 12 N. Y. 18 (1854).
" See Note 48 L. R. A. (x. s.) 794. Georgia recognizes this theory by
statute-GA. Civ. CODE 1910, § 4246, Glass v. Grant, 46 Ga. App. 327, 167
S. E. 727 (1933).
" Roberts v. Todd, 103 N. Y. 600, 9 N. E. 500 (1886) ; Washington Heights
M. E. Church v. Comfort, 138 Misc. 236, 246 N. Y. Supp. 450 (1930); Kentucky Baptist Educational Society v. Carter, 72 11. 247 (1874) ; (4) University
of Des Moines v. Livingston, 57 Iowa 307, 10 N. W. 738 (1881); Troy Conference Academy v. Nelson, 24 Vt. 189 (1852).
1 Fourth Presbyterian Church v. Continental Illinois Bank, 284 Ill. App.
132 (1936) (mere maintenance of the usual church activities was sufficient
reliance) ; Brokaw v. McElroy, 162 Iowa 288, 143 N. W. 1087; Furman University v. Waller, - S. C. -, 117 S. E. 356 (1923), discussed in (1936) 31
ILL. L. REv. 264; 25 R. C. L. 1402. "It is not essential for the sufficiency of
the consideration that the promise of the subscriber be the sore inducement to
the activities and expenditures of the beneficiary."
" "No doubt conceptions of public policy shape more or less subconsciously
the decision of the courts in these cases. Public policy calls for the enforcement of charitable subscriptions because the public is interested in the support,
growth and maintenance of charitable, religious, and educational institutions
and often their principal source of support comes from charitable subscriptions," WHITNEY, THiE LAW OF CONTRACTS (3d ed. '1936)
104. See also
BILLIG (1926) 12 CORN. L. Q. 467, at 479, where it is said: "A written subscription to charity signed by the subscriber or his agent and delivered to the
charity shall not be invalid or unenforcible for want of consideration." Id. at
480. Some courts hold that consideration is not necessary and allow the
charity to recover on the ground of public policy. Garrigus v. Home Frontier
and Missionary Society, 3 Ind. App. 91. 28 N. E. 1009 (1891); Hooker v.
Wittenburg College, 2 Cin. Sup. Rep. 353 (Ohio 1873) ; or on moral grounds,
Caul v. Gibson, 3 Pa. 416 (1846).
' Ex nudo pacto non oritur actio.
Stated briefly the doctrine of promissory estoppel is that action by the
promisee in justifiable reliance on the promise will make the promise binding.
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yoked, however, to save a subscription where the request or invitation that the promisee go on with his work can be implied from the
subscription agreement. 16
The old concept which regarded a contract as creating a strictly
personal obligation and was, therefore, not assignable, has long been
abandoned by common law 17 and by statute.' 8 The rule at present
is that any property right, not necessarily personal is assignable.
H. P. M.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LEGISLATIVE POWERS-IMPAIRMENT OF
THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS-DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS-SECTIONS 1083-A AND 10 8 3-B CIVIL PRACTIcE ACT CONSTRUED.-Plain-

tiff was the assignee of a bond and mortgage executed prior to the
mortgage moratorium legislation of 1933.1 On September 22, 1933, a
foreclosure action was commenced and after the sale of the property
plaintiff duly made a motion for the resulting deficiency. The trial
court denied the motion 2 whereupon the plaintiff discontinued the
foreclosure action as against the defendant and brought the present
action on the bond for the deficiency. The dismissal of this complaint by the lower court on the ground that it failed to state a cause
of action 3 was affirmed by the Appellate Division and the Court of
Appeals. 4 Upon certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States, the appellant argued that Sections 1083-a and 1083-b of the
Civil Practice Act were unconstitutional as they impaired the obligaop. cit. supra, at p. 106. "Certain at least it is that we have adopted
the doctrine of promissory estoppel as the equivalent of consideration in connection with our law of charitable subscriptions," per Cardozo, J., in Allegheny
College v. National Chautaugua County Bank, 246 N. Y. 369 at p. 374, 159
N. E. 173.
WHITNEY,

" Instant case.
" Hopkins v. Upshur, 20 Tex. 89 (1857) (charitable subscription case).
"8 PEs. PRoP. LAW § 41; Rosenthal Paper Box Co. v. National Folding
B. & P. Co., 226 N. Y. 313 (1919); Oconto Chamber of Commerce Co. v.
Gradwell, 175 Wis. 447, 185 N. W. 544 (1921). The duties created by such a
contract are non-assignable. Langel v. Betz, 250 N. Y. 159, 164 N. E. 890
(1928) ; Smith v. Morin Bros., Inc., 233 App. Div. 562, 253 N. Y. Supp. 368
(4th Dept. 1931).
'Laws of 1933, c. 793 and 794, in effect Aug. 28, 1933.
2 Civ. PRAC. AcT § 1083-a provides that a deficiency judgment may not be
obtained where the market value of the mortgaged premises exceeds the amount
of the judgment plus other liens, encumbrances and expenses of the action.
Civ. PpAc. AcT § 1083-a provides an exclusive manner for the granting

of a deficiency judgment and it must be granted in the foreclosure action.

'271 N. Y. 562, 3 N. E. (2d) 186 (1936), aff'd, on reargument 271 N. Y.

662, 3 N. E. (2d) 473 (1936)

(where the remittitur was amended to state that

"a Federal question was presented and necessarily passed upon" in order to
facilitate an appeal to the Supreme Court).

